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The Stoic Method of Happiness 
Ian Blecher 
Let a stoic arise who shall reveal the resources of man. .. 
- Emerson 
1 
The Stoics - most of them, anyway1 - held that: 
(1) Virtue is the sole good. 
(2) Outside the scope of virtue, some items are preferable to others. 
Not, however, without discomfort. From (1), and from ancient plati- 
tudes connecting oodness with happiness, we may infer that virtue is 
not only necessary, but also sufficient for happiness; and that therefore 
happiness is always within reach, even on the rack (de Fin III 42; cf. EN 
1000b22-1101a8). To be fair, the Stoics never claimed happiness must be 
always within easy reach; they were comfortable with the thought that 
only Socrates and Cato the Younger - if anyone at all - had the stuff 
for it.2 But this will hardly ease the impression - widespread, unfortu- 
nately - that theirs is a severe and joyless doctrine - thus, for example, 
Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit: 'Stoicism is the freedom which 
1 Diogenes Laertius reports that Panaetius and Posidonius reject (1) (DL VII 103, 128). 
2 For a discussion of the problems posed by this possibility, see Inwood 2005. 
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always comes directly out of bondage [viz.,] freedom in thought ... a 
truth lacking the fullness of life' (§§ 199-200).3 
In reply it might be observed that the Stoics also expounded doctrine 
(2); that they demonstrated sufficient concern for 'the fullness of life', for 
'the resources of man', just by ranking external goods. But - ranking 
them according to what ?It is not that it is obviously incoherent to prefer 
health and wealth and renown4 to say, having one's limbs torn from their 
sockets.5 It is that the sense in which such things are supposed to be 
preferred is difficult to make out if they are not simply better than the 
alternatives - if, that is, they are irrelevant to happiness. If it is intelli- 
gible to prefer something, one would think, this can only be because 
having it is good (though perhaps in a sense different from the sense in 
which virtue is good) (de Fin TV 20-2, 41, 57-60). This, presumably, is what 
moves Aristotle to say that virtue and its material conditions are needed 
for a happy life. 
But Aristotle's view is not without problems.6 The crass conclusion 
that an increase of wealth or other so-called external good should always 
cause greater happiness cannot be easily avoided once some role in the 
happy life has been provided external goods. In particular, it cannot be 
avoided by attributing to Aristotle the view that only that a minimum 
standard of external goods is required, increase beyond which does not 
make for a better life.7 For this is evidently to allow that decrease of 
external goods below that point makes for a worse life: and that Aristotle 
was unwilling to concede. '[T]he happy man can never become miser- 
able,' says he (EN llOlaó). What is left is something of a hodgepodge: 
'Success or failure in life does not depend on [external goods], but human 
life, as we said, needs these as well, while excellent activities or their 
opposites are what determine happiness or the reverse' (EN 1100b9-ll). 
3 Cf. also Diss 1 19. 
4 For catalogs of external goods, see, e.g., de Fin TV 20, 49. 
5 This is not, however, a unanimous opinion. For Pyrrho, Herillus of Carthage and 
Aristo of Chios, among others, external goods simply did not rate (de Fin II 35, 43; 
IV 42f.; V 23; DL VÜ 160, 165). 
6 The position developed in this paragraph closely follows that of Julia Annas 1993, 
364-84. 
7 Cf. Annas 1993, 382. 
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This sounds something like the Stoic view, actually: but rather than 
follow it through to the logical (though pruna facie unintuitive) conclu- 
sion that external goods are not, after all, good, Aristotle maintains that 
human life needs external goods if it is to attain to the evocative but 
obscure status of 'blessed' (¿iccmpioç - EN 1100b25 et passim). And this 
is unhelpful. For either it is better to be blessed than to be happy, in which 
case we ought properly to have in view the one and not the other as our 
ultimate nd (and the original problem with happiness now arises for 
blessedness), or it is not better to be blessed than to be happy, in which 
case it is unclear why one should want to be blessed. (Indeed it is unclear 
in precisely the sense that it is unclear why one should want external 
goods if having them does not make for a better life, which is of course 
the question in response to which the category of 'blessedness' was first 
introduced.) 
I agree with Julia Annas that claims (1) and (2) ought to be regarded 
as an attempt to clarify and stabilize Aristotle's position8 (though I think 
she is wrong about how the Stoics think it ought to be revised). Now it 
seems to me that any such attempt can succeed only if it does not simply 
cordon off virtue on the one hand and external goods on the other, and 
declare for each a separate sense of 'good' and a corresponding sense of 
'happy'. For from this the problem of the relation of the two sorts of good 
inevitably arises. We would be left with a version of, and not an improve- 
ment upon, Aristotle's solution to the problem (indeed, the Stoics were 
often accused - unfairly, I think - of failing sufficiently to distinguish 
themselves from Aristotle in this respect [cf. e.g., de Fin TV 11-13, 43; 
Comm not 1071B-C]). The right approach will instead derive both claims 
(1) and (2) from a single account of actions - one which shows them to 
have both virtue and external goods in view, but in such a way that 
success with regard to the one is necessary for the success of a given 
action, while success with regard to the other is not. 
The claim of this paper is that what I have called 'the right approach' 
is, indeed, the Stoic approach. I shall try, in what follows, to give an 
account of it. 
8 I do not claim, nor does Annas, that the Stoics took themselves to be responding to 
Aristotle in particular. They may simply have had in mind a position similar to his; 
or they may have been thinking of a position developed by Aristotle's followers. 
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2 
A popular sort of introduction to the Stoic conception of virtue takes the 
form of an analogy between virtue and some set of everyday doings. The 
following - drawn by several Stoics, beginning with Antipater in the 
third century BC9 is perhaps the best-known example: 
Just as a man whose task it is to shoot (conliniare) a spear or arrow at 
something has, as his ultimate nd, to do everything in his power to 
shoot straight, so it is with what we call the ultimate nd in life. In the 
case (of the archer), it is to shoot straight that he must do all he can; 
nonetheless, it is to do all he can to discharge the task (of shooting 
straight) that is (really) his ultimate nd. So it is with what we call the 
supreme good in life. But to hit something is, as we say, to be "selected" 
not "sought", (de Fin III 22; cf. Stob 5b3, 6a-c; Comm not 1071B-D.) 
The manuscript has perhaps been corrupted somewhat,10 and 
Cicero's Latin is uncharacteristically dense here (perhaps in an attempt 
to ape the style of Stoic dialectic [cf. de Fin Hl 19]). The idea seems in any 
case to be this: first, the ultimate end for a given archer is not that a given 
target be hit; rather his ultimate end is that he do the things required of 
him by the task in the appropriate way. And second, someone trying to 
be virtuous is like our archer in this respect. 
The analogy has never fared well outside the Stoa. Posidonius is said 
to have thought it contained 'a manifest inconsistency and nothing 
honorable or productive of happiness' (fr. 187; LS 1, 405). Alexander of 
Aphrodisias called it 'absurd' (de An II 164.6; LS 1, 401). And, of course, 
there is Plutarch's canonical objection: 
If someone were to say that archer does everything in his power not for 
the sake of hitting the target but for the sake of doing everything in his 
power, one would suppose him to be speaking in riddling and fantastic 
way. So it is with the idiots who insist hat the end of aiming at things 
in accordance with nature is not the getting but the taking and selecting 
of them, and that being healthy is not each man's end in his desire and 
9 Annas 1993, 402. Striker 1996, 310 gives another suggestion about its origin. Cf. also 
Alpers-Gölz 1976, 82. 
10 But cf. LS 2, 398. 
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pursuit of health, but on the contrary being healthy has reference to the 
desire and pursuit of being healthy. For what is the difference b tween 
someone's saying that health has come into being for the sake of drugs, 
not drugs for the sake of health, and one who makes the selection of 
drugs and their composition and use more choiceworthy than health, 
or rather regards health as not choiceworthy at all, but locates the end 
in activity concerning the drugs, and declares desire to be the end of 
the getting, not the getting the end of the desire? (Comm not 1071Fff.) 
Let us set aside, for the moment, his indecorous lack of sympathy for 
it, and observe how Plutarch brings the analogy into focus. The end of 
the archer - 'that the task be completed in the appropriate way' - is 
glossed here in terms of the practice of an art. And I think this is 
appropriate.11 For the standards by which even a failed attempt at hitting 
the target could count as a kind of success could only have come from 
their satisfying the standards of a general practice of target-hitting (that, 
for example, one assumed the proper oblique stance, nocked the arrow 
at a right angle, took account of the wind, released smoothly... But 
imagine someone failing not only to hit the target, but also even to try to 
do any of these things. Under what circumstances would we say such a 
person nevertheless did his best to hit the target?). 
So Plutarch as the analogy right; he only thinks it absurd that the 
ultimate nd of archers is not that targets be hit, but rather that archery 
be practiced appropriately - as it would be absurd to suppose that the 
ultimate nd of doctors is that medicine be practiced appropriately, and 
not that their patients' health improve. 
Contemporary scholarship has largely followed Plutarch in this, 
though it has refined his complaints somewhat. It is nowadays said that 
Stoic dogma entails, disastrously, that archery is - and archers, there- 
fore, ought to be - indifferent to hitting targets;12 that the standards by 
which archers actually judge their own performances are not those by 
1 1 Cf. Alpers-Gölz: 'Here the meaning of "conliniare" is important: its significance does 
not reside merely in the straightforward aim of hitting the target, but rather in the 
"aiming accurately" - the surehandedness, that is, which signifies the mastery of 
the art../ (1976, 81; my [somewhat liberal] translation). The relevance of Alpers- 
Gölz's marvellous book to this paper was brought to my attention by an anonymous 
referee. 
12 See, for example Annas 1993, 402. 
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which they ought to be judged;13 that archery must have been invented 
for the sake of shooting arrows.14 
It is sometimes added, as if in their defense, that he Stoics were aware 
of, and happy to accept, these consequences, and many more besides; 
that, in their view, the skeptic needs to revise his intuitions about such 
matters - indeed would revise them, if only he realized the significance 
of virtue.15 
Such considerations seem to me confused. The analogy with archery 
was supposed to help us realize the significance and scope of virtue in 
the first place - so it isn't much good to require us already to have 
realized them in order to grasp the analogy. Nor will a further analogy 
help (sports and acting, among others, having been suggested16). For the 
criteria according to which it would be a successful analogy could only 
have been supplied by a correct conception of virtue; but that conception 
was supposed to have been supplied (in part, at least) by the analogy 
with archery.17 
If the analogy is worth bothering about - and this paper is addressed 
to those who think it is - this can only be because it can supply 
non-Stoics with a correct conception of virtue. This will be possible under 
two conditions: first, it must not presuppose any prior philosophical 
commitments oStoic doctrines. Any interpretation of the analogy must 
therefore grant the default view, that archery was designed in order to 
hit targets. It is not as if this is some unexamined prejudice: the goal of 
target-hitting is pretty obviously the source of the systematic unity of the 
art (cf. SVF 1 73). How else should such diverse activities as checking the 
direction of the wind and tightening a bow-string and carrying around 
a quiver come to be essential parts of the same set of doings? 
13 See, for example Cooper 1999, 438. 
14 See, for example Striker 1996, 243, 307, 309. 
15 See Annas 1993, 399, 410. 
16 By Striker 1996, 245, 310 (but cf. Annas 402n., for a reply to this) and Cooper 1999, 
348 respectively. 
17 Of course the Stoics did draw an analogy between acting and virtue (see de Fin HI 
24f.). But that analogy was not, it seems to me, intended to explain how claims (1) 
and (2) may be held simultaneously. I consider what it was intended to explain in 
§4 below. 
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And second, it must be made clear why the analogy we are to consider 
is with archery, and not just any art - geometry or sculpture, say. We 
should take ourselves to have missed something if we conclude, with 
Annas, among others (1993, 400-2; cf. White 1990, n.36), that the analogy 
is meant only to alert us to a similarity between virtue and the other arts: 
so much is already clear from the Stoic definition of virtue as the 'xé%vr| 
Tiepi Tov ßiov' that is, the art of living (AM XI 170, 181, 184). Virtue must 
therefore come to resemble archery in a way which sets both of them 
apart from other arts. 
In the following section, I shall examine how an unprejudiced concep- 
tion of archery might nevertheless conform to Stoic thought about action. 
In §4 1 shall suggest what a conception of virtue analogous to this might 
look like. With this in place, it should be easier to see how claims (1) and 
(2) might be held simultaneously. I shall conclude by considering, in §5, 
an objection to the use I think the Stoics wish to make of the analogy with 
archery. 
3 
Take the claim that someone, given the task of hitting something with 
an arrow, would not try to hit the target, but rather to practice a certain 
art appropriately. Gisela Striker has suggested that we may suppose 
there are people so motivated, inasmuch as practically any motivation 
for doing anything will have its hour with someone ('I am voting 
Republican because Christ desires it of me . . . ') . But, she says, for this very 
reason the bare existence of someone so motivated tells us nothing about 
the proper attitude toward the good. What we want to know is whether 
it is right to try and practice archery properly given the task of hitting 
something with an arrow, not whether there xists omeone who would 
so try. The point of the analogy, she concludes, must actually have been 
to generalize about the end of archery as such.18 The claim the Stoics want 
us to consider would then be: 
(A) The end of archery is that archery be practiced appropriately. 
18 Striker 1996, 243, 306; a similar view can be found in Annas 1993, 400ff. 
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And, Striker concludes, this is more or less fatuous. For it was widely 
agreed among ancient philosophers that arts must differ from the objects 
for which they are practiced (the claim seems to have originated with 
Carneades; see de Fin V 16ff.; cf. Striker 1996, 311ff.). Even if this is not, 
strictly speaking true, archery does seem to be one of the class of arts so 
conceived (cf. Striker 1996, 245, 311ff.). Whereas, presumably, virtue is 
not: substituting Virtue' for 'archery' in (A) yields a claim we can take 
seriously. But it is not as thought the analogy with archery helped us to 
see this: it seemed rather to get in the way. 
Now it is perhaps peculiar that a reading which makes the analogy 
fatuous should have recommended itself to Striker over one which 
makes it look merely trivial. But let us consider whether these really are 
the only alternatives. Now certainly the issue cannot be whether some 
particular person might ry to practice archery, given a bow and arrows 
and something to hit. But why suppose we are speaking here of a 
particular person, the details of whose biography have simply been 
elided for convenience's sake? Isn't the idea rather that we want to know 
what a human being would do here? It is as if we had asked: what would 
a cat do given a saucer of milk? It would reflect a misunderstanding to 
reply: 'My Tibbies detests anything in a saucer'. In this example, we want 
to know about the nature of cats - not about Tibbies. In the case of the 
archer we want, analogously, to know whether 
(A') A given (good example of a) man, asked to hit something with 
a bow and arrows, would try to practice archery. 
accurately characterizes human nature, and not just whether it accu- 
rately characterizes the disposition of any actual persons. 
Now it surely isn't fatuous to say a man would practice archery in a 
given situation; nor is it trivial to describe him as trying to do so (as it 
may be to describe someone walking down the street as 'trying to walk 
down the street'). For he may well fail to practice archery in the right 
way even if he is good at it: it is understood this is not an easy thing to 
do (perhaps only Socrates and Cato the Younger were up to it ...). We 
seem to have a claim which we can take seriously, even if it turns out to 
be false. 
The claim can also be put this way: to practice archery is an end for 
our man because of what he is, and because of what archery is, and 
because of what his task is, and not because he just wants to (he is not 
selecting a brand of detergent). It is therefore a claim about the explana- 
tion of human actions of the relevant sort. If we want to know why a man 
acts as he does upon receiving some task, we cannot always, and because 
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not always, cannot ultimately advert to a supposed desire that the task 
be accomplished. We must cite a practice. 
Why should this be? Let us imagine someone whose actions vís-à-vís 
a given target all reflect the end that it be hit and nothing more. For such 
a person, practicing archery here is but the means to that end. Perhaps 
this sounds like a truism about arts: cobbling, we may say, is the means 
of producing shoes, gunsmithing the means of producing uns, geome- 
try the means of bissecting angles. . . But here we must note a peculiarity 
of archery (and the so-called 'stochastic' arts19). So long as all he wants 
is that a pair of shoes be made, a cobbler has no reason to try and achieve 
his end by any method other than cobbling. If he cobbles correctly, he 
will succeed. Success with archery is, however, a matter of probability. 
In certain cases, archers will stand a better chance of landing their arrow 
with a method other than archery. It may be preferable, for example, to 
throw the arrow at the target rather than to shoot it, or to walk up to the 
target and shove it into the bull's eye. Or, we may imagine the target is 
being guarded in such a way that there is only the slimmest chance of 
hitting it by means of archery; but that there is an extremely good chance 
of hitting it if one bribes the guard to shove an arrow into it. Here, we 
should say, the end that the target be hit demands that the guard be 
bribed. 
Now practicing archery is not the answer to every problem involving 
arrows ('I want you to fashion a duck decoy from this'). But I think we 
shall say our archer has misunderstood his task if he decides on bribery 
- that he has behaved unsportingly, perhaps; or that he has, by permit- 
ting himself this short-cut, merely rid himself of the task without actually 
accomplishing it. But why do we feel this way? Our archer will, after all, 
have brought it about that, by means of a bow and arrow, the target is 
hit. Why shouldn't his count as success? 
The problem comes into focus, I think, if we arrange for our archer's 
financial straits to be such that the money required for the bribe could 
only be raised by the sale of his bow. Now, as long as the end of our 
archer (as such) is simply that this target be hit, there will be no reason 
for him not to go ahead with the bribe. For the rationality of taking the 
means to an end is unaffected by considerations about one's ability to 
19 Arts, that is, whose successful performance is compatible with the failure to produce 
the end. Medicine and navigation are the standard examples. 
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realize like ends in the sequel unless those ends are already in view. And, 
by hypothesis, they are not - our archer has as his end nothing but the 
hitting of this target. 'You'll need your bow if you want to hit targets ever 
again' is, to him, inert. 
From this we should conclude that we do not think our archer's 
ultimate nd hitting a particular target. But what is his end if not this? 
The Stoics say - plausibly, in my view - it is that the target be hit 'in 
the right way [certo genere quodam, possibly rendering the Stoic term of 
art, KccOriKÓVTCoç] - not however one likes [quolibet]' {de Fin III 23-4). Here 
we are told 'in the right way' means 'consistently' (translating the Latin 
convenienta, itself translating the Greek 'o^ioXoyia [de Fin III 22]). This is, 
obviously, a peculiar gloss. But I think the claim is an intuitive one. To 
be concerned not just for the target's being hit but also for the way this 
is done is to be concerned for the 'consistent' - that is to say general - 
method of target-hitting being deployed in particular cases. Of course, 
given the vicissitudes archers face (wind, fleet-footed quarry, hostile 
guards...), no method for hitting targets could guarantee success in 
every instance. This is what it means that archery is a stochastic art. 
Nevertheless, we can devise a method to maximize the number of 
successes overall - viz., by organizing the body of practical knowledge 
about target-hitting with this in view (cf. SVF II 93-97; de Fin III 50; Allen 
1993, 89). 
Once the method of archery is in place, then even where bribing the 
guard is the surest way to hit a given target, and where trying to do things 
properly would make success terrifically unlikely, there is still reason to 
make a go of archery - then, indeed, for one in the position of our archer, 
bribing someone to shove an arrow into the target could not count as 
success at all. For now a particular attempt at target-hitting is to be 
judged by how the method employed would fare at hitting targets 
generally. And this is just to say that it is to be judged by the standards 
of archery.20 
This does not mean that our archer is not trying to hit the particular 
target, or that he should not be glad of hitting it, if he does (so long as 
20 I am not claiming archery (along with the other stochastic arts) is to be distinguished 
from non-stochastic arts in this respect; only that the general aim of arts as such is 
brought out most clearly in the case of the stochastic arts, since for non-stochastic 
artists there is never a conflict between the end in a particular case and the end in 
general. 
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'glad' does not stand for any emotional response. But a meaningful 
discussion of the Stoic theory of emotions here would be out of place 
here). Obviously he is trying to hit his target - trying to hit it by means 
of archery; and to this extent he may be glad of a particular success. But 
what our archer does in order to hit a particular target cannot be 
explained in terms of the end of success in that particular case. If we want 
to understand what he is doing, we will have to understand his actions 
in terms of the general practice of target-hitting - in terms, that is, of the 
art of archery. 
4 
I have not characterized the Stoic account of the archer in a way which 
distinguishes it from other ancient conceptions of art (cf. Allen 1993, 89; 
he cites, in this connection, Phœdr 269d-e, 272a-b; Rhet 1355blO-ll; Top 
101b5-10). And this was precisely the aim: to approach the analogy 
without prior commitment to a theory of virtue, so that it might be 
understood as an appeal to the uninitiated. Now we have to see what 
the appeal is. 
It can be put straightforwardly: virtue, as the Stoics understand it, is 
an art structurally similar to archery. 
Let us therefore say: given a particular task (of a sort I am about to 
specify), a (good example of a) man has reason to try to be virtuous, and 
not to try to accomplish the task. Assuming the analogy holds, it may 
well turn out in a lot of cases that trying to be virtuous will result in the 
task's being accomplished; but, in certain cases, a choice will have to be 
made in favor of practicing virtue and against a method much more 
likely to accomplish the task. 
Now the sort of task the Stoics must have in mind here is that which 
is given to a man in virtue of his being human: the task of attaining the 
so-called primary things according to nature (prima naturae - de Fin III 
16ff.; 7ipoT|Y|iéva mía cpúaiv - Stob II 6a; DL VII 105 et passim) - of 
attaining, in other words, those goods which satisfy his animal needs 
and desires. Though it is perhaps surprising iven claim (1) above, the 
Stoics never claimed that it is pointless or wicked to pursue such things, 
as though they were a distraction from the real work of cultivating virtue; 
on the contrary, they regarded pursuit of them as a necessary part of 
what it is to live as a human being (cf. de Tin III 39). 
'Every animal, as soon as it is born,' Cicero's Cato says, 
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is concerned with itself, and takes care to preserve itself. It favors its 
constitution a d whatever preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils 
from its destruction and whatever appears to promote its destruction. 
In support of this thesis, the Stoics point out that infants eek what is 
good for them and avoid the opposite before they ever feel pleasure or 
pain. This would not happen unless they valued their own constitution 
and feared destruction. But neither could it happen that they would 
seek anything at all unless they had self-awareness and thereby self- 
love. So one must realize that it is self-love that provides the primary 
motivation, (de Fin III 16; cf. Ep 121, DL VII 85) 
Now the claim of the analogy can be put this way: with a particular 
opportunity of promoting the maintenance of one's constitution in view 
- that is to say, given the opportunity to act - one always has reason 
to practice virtue, and not to seize the opportunity by whatever means 
happen to be most convenient. And indeed, this is what children who 
are brought up properly learn, the Stoics say. 
Hence Cicero's Cato: 
The initial "appropriate action" (by which I translate "kcc&tìkov") is to 
preserve oneself in one's natural constitution. The next is to take what 
is in accordance with nature and reject its opposite. Once this method 
of selection (and likewise rejection) has been discovered, selection then 
goes hand in hand with appropriate action. Then such selection be- 
comes continuous, and, finally, stable and in agreement with nature. 
At this point that which can truly be said to be good first appears and 
is recognized for what it is. (de Fin III 20) 
The import of this passage will come clear when we see why we ought 
not to ask, 'if man's first concern for rationality is a form of concern for 
himself, why should he come to completely neglect his animal nature?' 
(Striker 1996, 288, see also 289; Engberg-Pedersen 1986, 145ff.). It is not 
simply that the prospects for a satisfying answer to this question are 
bleak - though they are (see Striker 1996, 292). The question is simply 
confused. 
The suggestion is not at all that an adult's interest in virtue supplants 
childhood concerns with external goods (as we may say an interest in 
The New Yorker and Penthouse supplants a childhood interest in Boy's Life 
and Mad). The suggestion is rather that over time a method for the 
selection and rejection of external goods takes shape. Prior to this, 
selection and rejection still happened - only not methodically. That is 
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to say, it happened without a view to what is good for a human being 
throughout a life. But it is only the haphazardness which has to be 
abandoned - not the 'animal nature'. 
Part of the upbringing of a child will therefore involve explanations 
of the sort, 'Because if you gobble up all the raisins now you won't have 
any when you want them later/ and 'Because I wouldn't trust someone 
who lies,' and 'Because it is impolite and unsanitary to pick one's nose, 
that's why.' And this is because, though children do not, according to 
the Stoic way of thinking, need to learn to desire particular external 
goods, they do need to learn how their particular actions bear on their 
prospects for securing those goods in the long term. This is surely not to 
learn that securing those goods is not important at all. On the contrary: 
it is to learn that the greatest possible number of such goods can be 
secured throughout a lifetime only by means of a general method. And, 
of course, it is to learn that the piecemeal means children (and Cyrenaics) 
use will make this harder - will lead, in the most extreme case, to their 
being unable to secure any goods at all. Consider the response of Xeno- 
phon's Socrates to Aristippus' view that one ought always and only to 
do what brings immediate pleasure. Such a person, Socrates says, would 
not long be able to gratify himself in this way. He would soon find 
himself a slave to those who became strong by delaying gratification 
(Mem II 1 10-15; cf. Annas 1993, 227). 
And this general method is called 'virtue'. Now the Stoic claim is that, 
after learning the method of virtue, one will concern oneself more with 
its employment than with getting the particular items to be selected. 
Perhaps this sounds implausible - the method is, after all, a means of 
securing precisely those items (or so we may suppose, anyway). But it is 
by now, I hope, sounding a little more familiar. We have to hear the 
appropriate concern as a general one, to be contrasted with a concern for 
getting some particular external good. That is what the analogy with 
archery was supposed to teach us. 
This does not mean, of course, that if I stop myself stealing this pear 
from the market, I shall someday have many more pears. Perhaps, after 
not stealing the pear, I shall be stabbed to death on the bus home. (Does 
a great lode of pears count always as a good? We mustn't, in any case, 
equate success at securing external goods with mere accumulation of 
wealth - perhaps too many pears would impede my securing health, 
or good friends, or. . .) The point is, however, a point about how to justify 
what I am doing: in light of my ultimate nd - viz., that I lead a happy 
life - my actions would be at best arbitrary if they were not directed at 
securing the greatest share of external goods throughout a life as such 
This content downloaded from 165.82.134.26 on Fri, 2 Jan 2015 08:42:53 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
170 Ian Blecher 
(though perhaps, it may turn out, not my life in particular, if I am after 
all stabbed). The securing of no (even very high) number of particular 
goods could attain to the sort of generality which this end has in view. 
This incommensurability of the particular with respect to the general is, 
I think, what justifies the Stoic claim that 'the particular value of virtue 
is distinct: a matter of kind, not degree' (de Fin HI 34; see also in 39): the 
point is not that the number of goods obtained be absolutely high, but 
that it be as high as possible, whether or not what is possible is actually 
very much. 
And, conversely, if we are to understand the actions of someone 
virtuous - his abstaining from food and drink now and then, his giving 
away his money to the poor, his wearing the occasional beard of bees - 
we must understand them as directed at the ultimate aim of securing 
external goods throughout a life (as such) and not of securing, say, this 
pear, for him, now. 
Here let us revisit claims (1) and (2). To say that virtue is the sole good 
is, as I said, to say that virtue and nothing else makes for a happy life. 
But why think this a severe and joyless doctrine? Itcannot be a contingent 
fact about virtue that it is a means of deciding which external goods to 
pursue, as if its 'intrinsic value' were some separate matter, to be ex- 
plained by its possession of wondrous abstracta. On the contrary: virtue 
would have nothing to recommend it - would be no more than Hegel's 
contentless 'freedom in thought' - if it were second-best as a practical 
method; if there were some other less pretty but more efficient alterna- 
tive method in the application of which children might be tutored. The 
practical (by which I mean both extrinsic and intrinsic) benefits of the 
virtuous life (as conceived by the Stoics, anyway), are inseparable from 
it. If they were not, it would be hard to see how virtue alone could make 
a person happy. 
I think we can say, therefore, that claim (1) is designed to encompass 
all those parts of life which Aristotle counted valuable - both virtues 
and their earthly rewards - but in such a way that no question about 
their elation eed ever arise. The cases of conflict which have sometimes 
been emphasized here (shall I save the orphanage or buy a quite nice 
pen?)21 must come to be regarded as conflicts not between distinct ends 
or impulses, but between methods of satisfying the selfsame nd. This 
21 See for example Inwood 1985, 210ff. He cites, in this connection, Ep 76.18. 
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evidently requires us not - as Aristotle does - to begin by explaining 
what the virtues are, and then considering what other sorts of goods 
there might be; or - as Aristotle also does - to distinguish a number of 
goods, and then try to uncover their relative import to the happy life. 
Virtue must rather be conceived, from the beginning of the account, as 
inseparable from all questions about the good, which includes questions 
about the value of external goods. And this is a consequence of the 
conception which I think the Stoic Bildungstheorie invites us to have. For 
according to it, virtue just is the art of selection among external goods. 
But if claim (1) already gives a full accounting of the relation between 
virtue and external goods, what is the purpose of claim (2), the claim that 
securing some mere things is preferable? Here, I think, we should recall 
the analogy with archery. Our archer's commitment is to practicing his 
art, not to hitting his target; but that does not mean, as I said, that he is 
not in some sense trying to hit the target - or that he would not be at all 
glad of succeeding in a particular instance. Similarly, a particular human 
action is, in some sense, an attempt to secure a particular external good; 
and it is hard to see why the virtuous agent should not be glad of this 
just because he has prudently deployed a method of acting designed for 
general, and not for particular, success. 
Given the way things go, the method will of course sometimes require 
us to choose courses of action less likely to secure any external good at 
all than, say, simply stealing the pear; but failure in this regard is merely 
trivial if the overall share of goods is increased more by the employment 
of a method which in this case fails to secure the relevant good. The point 
of claim (2) is therefore not to give us a way to think about the relation 
of virtue to external goods, but rather to give us a way to think about the 
relation of particular actions (and their particular ends) to our general 
method of living (and its ultimate end). And the claim is: the success of 
the former must be judged by the lights of the latter - by whether it 
manifests a consistent method, and not whether it secures ome particu- 
lar external good. For in the case of virtue, as with stochastic arts 
generally, these criteria will sometimes come apart. 
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The claim of analogy between virtue and archery was, I think, meant to 
be controversial. InAristotle's view someone who approached practical 
mattes the way an artist approaches his art would miss what is distinc- 
tive about virtuous actions: that here is no item which they aim to secure 
(EN 1140al-23; 1140b20-30). Their end is simply that they be done. 
This is, in other words, to take seriously the dzsanalogy between 
archery and virtue I adumbrated in §2 above: we resist 
(A) The end of archery is that archery be practiced appropriately, 
in a way we do not resist 
(V) The end of virtue is that virtue be practiced appropriately. 
Now if (V) is the last word on the subject - a possibility I shall 
consider in a moment - it is clear that our original problem, the problem 
about the relation of virtue to external goods, inevitably arises. For if 
virtuous actions do not aim at anything beyond their own performance, 
a full account of them can be given without mentioning wealth and 
health and renown. The value of items of the latter sort - if indeed they 
are valuable - will then have to be made out separately. And here is 
where things get sticky: are external goods valuable in themselves? If so, 
they are a kind of good distinct from virtue; but how is the relation 
between this sort of good and virtue to be made out? Or: are external 
goods valuable as the material condition for virtuous actions? Suppose, 
however, we should fail to secure them. Would virtuous action - and 
therefore happiness - then be impossible? Certainly no one among the 
ancients was willing to say this. Or: are external goods not valuable at 
all? But surely some such things are preferable to others! 
One might suppose the analogy with archery is meant to resist this 
line of thought, and to embrace instead one which makes concise the 
relation of virtue to external goods as the relation of a method of securing 
something to the items secured. 
The trouble is, though, the Stoics did not resist (V). On the contrary, 
they shared to some extent Aristotle's intuition that virtuous action is 
valuable intrinsically: 'Nor do we think wisdom is like navigation or 
medicine, but rather more like acting or dancing. . . [For] the desired end 
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is located within the [virtuous] act/ Cicero's Cato says, just two para- 
graphs after presenting the analogy with archery (de Fin III 24, S222).23 
What might we make of this? It seems to me there are two questions 
here. There is a question about what to make of Cato's assertion that 
wisdom is not like navigation or medicine - or presumably any stochas- 
tic art - given the text which precedes it. And there is a question about 
what to make of the assertion that wisdom is like dancing. Let us take 
them in turn. 
As regards the first question: John Cooper has said the passage was 
Very likely' intended to report both sides of an intestine debate (cf. 1999, 
438n). Now, it is possible such a debate took place. But, first, there is no 
evidence to suggest Cicero was aware of one. And second, even if he 
was, it would hardly explain the straightforward inconsistency in what 
purports to be a single account of the nature of virtue - especially given 
Cicero's care to distinguish explicitly the views of different sects within 
the schools whose views he considers (cf. de Fin III 33). Perhaps it would 
be better to say something like this: Cato is claiming simply that virtue 
is in some respect different from the stochastic arts, though of course 
there are the similarities mentioned at III 22. This not what Cato actually 
says, unfortunately; then again, what he actually says is intolerable, and 
I am not sure how else to get around it.24 Suppose, then, that it is what 
he meant. 
If it is, we can say, as regards the second question, that he comparison 
with dance is intended to complement, not to undermine, the account of 
virtue I reproduced in §3 above. What was missing from that account 
was evidently an explanation of the intrinsic worth of virtuous actions: 
for it seems the value of the art of archery is derived from the value of 
22 III 32 is bracketed by the Oxford Classical Text edition as irrelevant to its context. 
Annas helpfully suggests it would fit well with III 24, and with this in mind, I have 
run the two passages together. 
23 Strictly speaking, of course, Cato does not back down from the claim that virtue is 
an art here (or elsewhere). But he may as well have: it is no longer clear why it 
matters that we are regarding virtue as an art, and not as a sui generis property of 
actions which nevertheless hares something with dancing. 
24 It is always open to us to speculate about the corruption of the manuscript, of course; 
but such speculation, based on nothing but philosophical bewilderment, seems to 
me unnecessarily desperate here. 
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hitting the greatest possible number of targets; but we should not like to 
say that he value of the art of living is derived from the value of securing 
external goods - even the value of securing the greatest possible num- 
ber of them - or, really, that it is derived from anything to which it 
would then be a means. In this respect, I take Cato to be claiming, virtue 
is like dancing (and unlike archery): the value of the action which 
manifests the proper method of selection is wholly contained in its 
performance. 
Perhaps this sounds like a repudiation of the analogy with archery. 
But I do not think it is. The point of that analogy was to alert us to some 
structural peculiarities which virtue, understood as the method of selec- 
tion of external goods, shares with stochastic arts (e.g., its demand that 
securing an external good in a particular case be sacrificed in favor of 
success overall). But this was a point about the relation of virtue to the 
choice of particular actions, not a point about the relation of a particular 
virtuous action to the virtuous life as a whole.25 This latter relation is 
quite different from the former. For no choice ever need be made 
between being virtuous hie et nunc and being virtuous throughout life. 
The one is just a part of the other. But precisely because a particular 
virtuous action is a part of the virtuous life, we do not say the one is a 
means to the other (as we do not normally say that the pas de deux at 
the end of Act I is a means to the performance of Le Corsaire). 
The intrinsic value of the virtuous life apparently consists in its being 
- not a means to, but identical with - the happy life, where happiness 
is understood as absolutely valuable (cf. EN 1097a35-b7). So, we can say, 
the intrinsic value of a particular virtuous action consists in its being - 
not a means to, but identical with - a part of the happy life. 
But this is perfectly compatible with the account of §3 above; there is 
no reason particular virtuous actions could not bear the relation to the 
virtuous life as a whole which the analogy with dance suggests and still 
be the best method of selection among external goods. All this would 
mean is that to practice that method is to lead a happy life (and the 
converse). There is no reason why the value of virtue should not be 
compatible with the relation it bears to the accretion of external goods 
25 Hence Inwood rightly speaks of the 'limited aims of the author of this analogy', 
1985, 213. 
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- so long, that is, as we do not infer from this that the value is derived 
from that relation. But this - I have argued - is precisely what we shall 
have understood when we have understood how (1) is compatible with 
(2).26 
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26 For comments on, and discussions related to, this paper, I thank Matt Boyle, Chris 
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